

EXHIBIT F

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

VERIZON NEW YORK INC. and LONG ISLAND
LIGHTING COMPANY d/b/a LIPA,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

THE VILLAGE OF WESTHAMPTON BEACH,
THE VILLAGE OF QUOGUE and THE TOWN
OF SOUTHAMPTON,

Defendants.

11-CV-252 (LDW)

**ANSWER TO
COUNTERCLAIMS**

**ANSWER OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY d/b/a LIPA TO
COUNTERCLAIMS FILED BY THE VILLAGE OF WESTHAMPTON BEACH**

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY d/b/a LIPA (“LIPA”), by and through its undersigned attorneys, as and for its Answer to the counterclaims (the “Counterclaims”) asserted by Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff THE VILLAGE OF WESTHAMPTON BEACH (“WHB”), states as follows:

1. The Long Island Power Authority (“LIPA”) admits that the EEEA seeks to establish an eruv, part or all of which would be located in the Village of Westhampton Beach.
2. LIPA admits that the EEEA claims an eruv is a defined area that enables members of the Jewish faith with certain religious beliefs to carry or push objects within that area on the Sabbath and Yom Kippur. LIPA otherwise denies the allegation as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the EEEA’s full claims regarding the religious significance of an eruv.
3. LIPA admits that the EEEA has asked Verizon and LIPA to allow the EEEA to attach thin strips, known as lechis, to utility poles; LIPA admits LIPA and Verizon have entered

into written agreements with EEEA that contemplate issuing licenses to allow the attachment of lechis to certain poles; and admits that some of the telephone and utility poles are located in the Village of Westhampton Beach, but LIPA otherwise denies the allegations.

4. LIPA admits that lechis could be visible to persons who closely inspect a utility pole, but otherwise denies the allegations.

5. LIPA denies the allegations.

6. LIPA admits that for members of the Jewish faith with certain religious beliefs an eruv is a defined area that enables them to carry or push objects within that area on the Sabbath and on Yom Kippur. LIPA otherwise denies the allegations as LIPA is without knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the specific significance that an eruv carries for such members of the Jewish faith. The first sentence of paragraph six also states a legal conclusion as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations.

7. The terms “religious symbol” and “religious message” state legal conclusions as to which no response is required. The term “known to the general public” is so imprecise as to prevent a meaningful response. To the extent a response is required, upon information and belief, LIPA denies the allegations.

8. The term “the religious meaning of an eruv has been part of the public discourse” is so imprecise as to prevent a meaningful response. To the extent a response is required as to the first sentence, and as to all remaining allegations in the paragraph, upon information and belief LIPA denies the allegations.

9. The paragraph’s assertion that existence of an eruv on public property would communicate endorsement states a legal conclusion as to which no response is required. To the

extent a response is required as to that allegation, and as to the remaining allegations, LIPA denies the allegations

10. LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to Verizon's intentions or purposes.

11. LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to Verizon's intentions.

12. These allegations state a legal conclusion as to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the existence, application and terms of the franchise agreements referenced.

13. LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations.

14. LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations. In any event, any franchise agreement or document speaks for itself and LIPA therefore denies the allegation to the degree it summarizes such agreement rather than presents its exact terms.

15. LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations. In any event, any franchise agreement or document speaks for itself and LIPA therefore denies the allegation to the degree it summarizes such agreement rather than presents its exact terms.

16. LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations. In any event, any franchise agreement or document speaks for itself

and LIPA therefore denies the allegation to the degree it summarizes such agreement rather than presents its exact terms.

17. LIPA denies the allegation as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations. In any event, any franchise agreement or document speaks for itself and LIPA therefore denies the allegation to the degree it summarizes such agreement rather than presents its exact terms.

18. LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegation. In any event, any franchise agreement or document speaks for itself and LIPA therefore denies the allegation to the degree it summarizes such agreement rather than presents its exact terms.

19. LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegation. In any event, any franchise agreement or document speaks for itself and LIPA therefore denies the allegation to the degree it summarizes such agreement rather than presents its exact terms.

20. LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegation. In any event, any franchise agreement or document speaks for itself and LIPA therefore denies the allegation to the degree it summarizes such agreement rather than presents its exact terms.

21. LIPA admits that Verizon maintains it has sufficient legal authority to grant the EEEA licenses to attach lechis to its poles. LIPA otherwise denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the bases on which Verizon maintains that such authority exists.

22. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations.

23. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations.

24. LIPA admits that the allegation quotes in part from New York Transportation Corporations Law § 27. LIPA respectfully refers the Court to New York Transportation Corporations Law § 27 for a complete and accurate statement of its contents.

25. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations.

26. LIPA denies the allegation as the allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations.

27. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

28. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. LIPA respectfully refers the Court to New York Transportation Corporations Law § 11(3) for a complete and accurate statement of its contents. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

29. These allegations state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations except to the extent that they pertain to

Verizon's telephone poles, for which allegations LIPA lacks sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations and therefore denies them.

30. These allegations state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations and respectfully refers the Court to the Franchise Agreement for a complete and accurate statement of its contents, which document speaks for itself.

31. These allegations state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations and respectfully refers the Court to the Franchise Agreement for a complete and accurate statement of its contents, which document speaks for itself.

32. LIPA admits that LILCO acquired certain Riverhead assets. LIPA admits LIPA acquired certain assets of LILCO. LIPA otherwise denies the allegations.

33. These allegations state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations and respectfully refers the Court to the Franchise Agreement for a complete and accurate statement of its contents, which document speaks for itself.

34. These allegations state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations and respectfully refers the Court to the Franchise Agreement for a complete and accurate statement of its contents, which document speaks for itself.

35. These allegations state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations and respectfully refers the Court to the

franchise agreements for a complete and accurate statement of their contents, which documents speak for themselves.

FIRST COUNTERCLAIM

36. In response to paragraph 36, LIPA incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through 35, as though fully set forth herein.

37. The paragraph contains allegations not directed toward LIPA, and thus no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations.

38. The paragraph contains allegations not directed toward LIPA, and thus no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations.

39. The paragraph contains allegations not directed toward LIPA, and thus no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations.

40. The paragraph contains allegations not directed toward LIPA, and thus no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations.

41. The paragraph contains allegations not directed toward LIPA, and thus no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations.

42. The paragraph contains allegations not directed toward LIPA, and thus no response is required.

SECOND COUNTERCLAIM

43. In response to paragraph 43, LIPA incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through 35, as though fully set forth herein.

44. LIPA admits that, upon appropriate clarification of the validity of the various legal claims that various entities have asserted, LIPA is prepared to issue licenses to allow lechis to be installed on certain utility poles within the Village of Westhampton Beach. LIPA otherwise denies the allegation.

45. LIPA admits that it maintains it has authority to issue licenses to allow lechis to be installed on certain utility poles. LIPA denies that the allegation fully sets forth the legal authority that LIPA possesses to issue licenses to allow lechis to be installed.

46. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

47. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

48. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

49. LIPA admits that between LIPA and WHB there is an actual, justiciable controversy that is ripe for adjudication pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. LIPA otherwise denies the allegation.

THIRD COUNTERCLAIM

50. In response to paragraph 50, LIPA incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through 35, as though fully set forth herein.

51. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

52. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

53. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

54. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation except as to whether religious symbols

are anywhere present on WHB public property, which is denied as LIPA is without sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the allegation.

55. This allegation states legal conclusions regarding N.Y. Village Law Section 6-602 to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

56. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

FOURTH COUNTERCLAIM

57. In response to paragraph 57, LIPA incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through 35, as though fully set forth herein.

58. LIPA admits that it is a corporate municipal instrumentality and political subdivision of the State of New York. LIPA denies that this description fully states the powers and legal status granted LIPA. The further allegations state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegations.

59. This allegation states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, LIPA denies the allegation.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

LIPA denies that Westhampton Beach is entitled to any of the relief requested.

DEFENSES AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

LIPA asserts the following defenses and/or affirmative defenses and reserves the right to assert other defenses and claims, including, without limitations, counterclaims, cross claims, and third-party claims, as and when appropriate and/or available in this or any other action. The statement of any defense herein does not assume the burden of proof for any issue as to which applicable law otherwise places the burden of proof on Plaintiff.

Except as expressly stated above, LIPA denies each and every allegation in WHB's Counterclaims.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Counterclaims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

WHB lacks standing to assert some or all of the claims asserted in its Counterclaims.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

WHB's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, laches, acquiescence, license, and/or ratification, as well as other applicable equitable doctrines.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

LIPA erects and maintains utility poles under the authority granted under Section 1020, *et seq.* of the Public Authorities Law (the "LIPA Act") which grants LIPA general broad powers, including the power to "sell, convey, lease, exchange, transfer, abandon or otherwise dispose of, or mortgage, pledge or create a security interest in, all or any of its assets, properties or any interest therein, wherever situated" and the power "to make and execute agreements, contracts and other instruments necessary or convenient in the exercise of the powers and functions of the authority under this title." LIPA Act § 1020, *et seq.* In addition to the LIPA Act, the Public Authorities Accountability Act authorizes LIPA to dispose of its interests in property to others without limitations in purpose. *See* N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 2895-2897.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Under New York State law, LIPA may enter into contractual arrangements with others for the use of space on its poles. *See New York Tel. Co. v. North Hempstead*, 86 Misc. 2d 487 (Nassau Co. 1975), *aff'd* 52 A.D.2d 934 (2d Dep't 1976), *modified* 41 N.Y.2d 691(1977).

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Under New York State law, even if LIPA had installed its utility poles pursuant to a “franchise,” which LIPA contests, the right to use utility poles would be subject only to such limitations as were expressly set forth in the franchise itself, and in the absence of an express limitation the utility would be free to issue licenses to other parties for the use of the utility’s poles. *See North Hempstead*, 41 N.Y.2d at 698.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Allowing the installation of lechis on utility poles that LIPA controls is a permissible accommodation of religious practice permitted under the First Amendment.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Refusing to permit the EEEA to attach lechis to LIPA’s poles exposes LIPA to claims that by refusing LIPA violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, LIPA respectfully requests that the Court dismiss WHB’s claims against LIPA; enter a judgment that Westhampton Beach takes nothing; award costs, disbursements, and attorneys’ fees to LIPA; and grant LIPA all such other and further relief, whether in law or equity, to which LIPA is entitled and that the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: Uniondale, New York
August 2, 2012

/s/ Ronald J. Tenpas
Ronald J. Tenpas
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
1111 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Telephone: (202) 739-5435
Facsimile: (202) 739-3001
Counsel for Long Island Lighting Company d/b/a LIPA

LONG ISLAND POWER AUTHORITY
Michele A. Pincus
Associate General Counsel
333 Earle Ovington Blvd.
Uniondale, NY 11553
Telephone: (516) 719-9884
Facsimile: (516) 222-9137

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on August 2, 2012, the foregoing Answer of Long Island Lighting Company d/b/a LIPA to Counterclaims Filed by the Village of Westhampton Beach was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court in accordance with the Eastern District's Rules on Electronic Service upon all counsel of record.

/s/ Ronald J. Tenpas
Ronald J. Tenpas
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 739-5435
Counsel for Plaintiff Long Island Lighting Company d/b/a
LIPA

EXHIBIT G

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LONG ISLAND OFFICE

CV-12 3760
Civ. No.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----x
JEWISH PEOPLE FOR THE BETTERMENT OF
WESTHAMPTON BEACH, ARNOLD SHEIFFER,
and ESTELLE LUBLINER,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

THE VILLAGE OF WESTHAMPTON BEACH,
EAST END ERUV ASSOCIATION, VERIZON
NEW YORK INC. and LONG ISLAND LIGHTING
COMPANY d/b/a LIPA,

Defendants.
-----x

COMPLAINT

WEXLER, J
LINDSAY, M.

Introduction

1. The establishment of an eruv within the Village of Westhampton Beach will constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United State Constitution and cause real and actual harm to the community and its residents. The eruv contemplated and intended for imminent construction by Defendant East End Eruv Association ("EEEE"), with the aid and cooperation of defendants Verizon and LIPA, will mark certain wholly public spaces within the Village with religious significance. Indeed, it will invest a large portion of the Village with a narrow and parochial religious function. Although proponents of the eruv are quick to tout what they contend is the *nearly* invisible nature of the *lechis* and other components of the eruv, it is those same proponents themselves who insist, based upon their particular interpretation of Jewish law, on the actual physical presence of the eruv. The eruv, of course, will *not* go unnoticed; rather, it will be a constant and ever-present symbol, message and

reminder to the community at large, that the secular public spaces of the Village have been transformed for religious use and identity; to the non-Jewish residents, that the Village and LIPA have given preferred status to the Jewish religion as the only faith permitted to permanently affix religious symbols to utility poles within the Village or to physically demarcate certain public spaces with particular religious significance; and to large portions of the Jewish community within the Village, that one particular form of Judaism has been preferred and endorsed by the Village over another.

2. Plaintiff Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach, Inc., a/k/a JPOE (hereinafter, "JPOE") is opposed to the establishment of an eruv in the Village. Many of JPOE's members, including Mr. Sheffer and Ms. Lubliner, are proud and observant Jews who belong to Jewish denominations which do not accept, and in many cases are officially critical of the concept of an eruv as a valid interpretation of Jewish law. Other JPOE members include individuals who practice other faiths, and individuals of a secular persuasion, all of whom also reasonably view the concept of an eruv as a public symbol of a particular religious belief which they do not accept and which has no place being imposed upon them or endorsed by municipal or other public agencies.

3. Many Jews reject the very concept of an eruv, and sincerely believe that the particular form of Jewish belief and observance that elevates such legalistic constructs over the true spiritual values of Judaism and the Sabbath is abhorrent to their own religious views and interpretation of Jewish law. Indeed, it is the official position of the Central Conference of American Rabbis ("CCAR"), the umbrella rabbinical organization of Reform Judaism in the United States, that an eruv is a sort of "legal fiction" which is inconsistent with the true "spirit" of Jewish law. *See CCAR Responsa – 178, Eruv* dated July 1983.

4. JPOE respects the rights of all persons to practice and observe their religions according to the dictates of their own conscience. JPOE does not dispute the right of the EEEA and its members to practice Judaism according to the dictates of their own conscience and beliefs, through whatever private means are at their disposal. JPOE does not ask or expect this Court to prefer or adopt its members' version of Jewish law over the religious views of the EEEA and its adherents, or indeed to intervene in these religious disputes in any manner whatsoever. However, JPOE vigorously disputes the right of the EEEA and its members to impose their views on the rest of the Village by having the symbol of their particular kind of observance permanently affixed to and openly displayed on public property within their communities.

5. Indeed, the whole point of the eruv, for those who observe it, is to openly and *visibly* demarcate a certain geographic area as a *Jewish* precinct, i.e., a symbolic extension of a *Jewish* home. Moreover, the suggestion that JPOE's members should not be concerned or offended by the prospect of the erection of an eruv to demarcate the neighborhoods where they live and work, because they "won't notice it" or might somehow not understand what it symbolizes, is truly condescending and offensive to JPOE and its members, who will be confronted with the EEEA's religious display on a daily basis.

6. JPOE and its members do not want to live in a community where their government – i.e, the Village and LIPA itself – is reasonably seen and understood by them as endorsing particular religious beliefs and practices that they do not hold or which they affirmatively oppose.

Parties

7. Plaintiff Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach, Inc., a/k/a JPOE (hereinafter, "JPOE") is a not-for-profit corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.

8. Arnold Sheiffer ("Sheiffer") is Chairman of JPOE and resides at 5 Oneck Road, Wethampton Beach, New York 11978.

9. Estelle Lubliner ("Lubliner") is a member of JPOE and resides at 36 Sweetgrass Road, Westhampton Beach, New York 11978.

10. Defendant Village of West Hampton Beach is an incorporated village formed and existing pursuant to New York Village Law with offices located at 165 Mill Road, Westhampton Beach, New York 11978.

11. Upon information and belief, Defendant EEEA is a not-for-profit-corporation formed and operating under the laws of the State of New York with offices at 32 East 57th Street, New York, New York 10022.

12. Defendant Long Island Lighting Company d/b/a LIPA (hereinafter, "LIPA") is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York, with a principal place of business located at 333 Earle Ovington Blvd., Uniondale, New York 11501, and is wholly owned subsidiary of, and is operated and controlled by, the Long Island Power Authority, a New York Public Authority and political subdivision of the State of New York.

13. Defendant Verizon New York Inc. is a corporation with offices located at 140 West Street, New York, New York 10007; it is a subsidiary of Verizon Communications, Inc., a publicly held corporation.

14. Upon information and belief, the constitutional violations alleged herein have been caused by, and permitted by, certain individual officials and/or employees of the Village and of LIPA, the identities of whom shall be a matter for discovery herein, as well as by the policies and practices of said public authorities.

Jurisdiction and Venue

15. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3) and 1343(a)(4).

16. This Court has authority to grant the relief sought herein under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 (declaratory and further relief based upon said declaration), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (damages for constitutional violations), and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (attorneys fees).

17. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because defendant Village of Westhampton Beach is located within this district and all defendants are residents of this State, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the events giving rise to this claim occurred in this district and because the property and geographical area that is the subject of the action is situated in this district.

Factual Allegations

EEEA Seeks to Establish and Eruv in Westhampton Beach

18. EEEA intends to erect and establish, imminently, an eruv in the Village of Westhampton Beach.

19. Upon information and belief, an eruv is a continuous physical boundary and visible demarcation of a defined geographic area within which adherents subscribing to a certain

interpretation of Jewish law believe that they may perform certain activities that are otherwise prohibited on the Jewish Sabbath and Yom Kippur.

20. An eruv may be established, in whole or in part, by the physical attachment of staves, known as *lechis*, to utility poles and wires defining the geographic boundaries of the eruv, or, in any case, in such manner as may be specifically dictated by particular orthodox leaders.

21. Upon information and belief, the eruv that EEEA contemplates establishing in the Village would largely be formed by attaching lechis, upwards of forty inches in length, to Verizon and LIPA utility poles located within the Village and upon its rights of way.

22. Upon information and belief, the EEEA and/or those aligned in interest with the EEEA have been pursuing the establishment of an eruv in the Westhampton Beach area for several years. However, upon further information and belief, the only formal application the eruv proponents ever made to the Village for permission to erect the eruv was later withdrawn. Upon information and belief, a similar application was recently made by the EEEA to the neighboring Village of Quogue and was denied.

23. Upon information and belief, although the EEEA contends that the location, size, dimension and scope of the eruv is borne out of necessity for same, it has in fact frequently modified and altered the proposed eruv.

The Eruv Violates the Establishment Clause

24. Upon information and belief, according to certain interpretations and practices of Jewish law or religion, the carrying of objects between private and public domains is prohibited on the Sabbath and Yom Kippur.

25. Upon information and belief, according to certain interpretations and practices of Jewish law or religion, an eruv, in concept and application, intends to and does join and mix the private domain and the public domain.

26. Upon information and belief, according to certain interpretations and practices of Jewish law or religion, those portions of the public domain that are merged with the private domain by virtue of the eruv are thereby transformed such that such public spaces are deemed an extension of the private Jewish residence inclusive of all the religious significance thereof.

27. An eruv, by its very nature, is inherently a religious symbol, whose physical presence and embodiment has no meaning or significance except as the visual expression and public communication of its adherents' personal, individual interpretation of Jewish law and religious beliefs.

28. An eruv serves no secular purpose and has no secular meaning or significance.

29. The eruv is only of any functional relevance to its proponents on the Sabbath and Yom Kippur, *i.e.*, days of particular *religious* significance.

30. An eruv conveys, and the contemplated eruv in Westhampton Beach will convey, a specific and particularized communicative message to adherents of particular branches of the Jewish faith, signaling to them where, when, and what they may permissibly do in public within their understanding and practice of their religion.

31. An eruv conveys, and the contemplated eruv in Westhampton Beach will convey, an equally specific and particularized communicative message to the community at large that the governmental authorities, the Village and LIPA, have selected one particular form of Judaism for special and preferential treatment over other religions as well as over secular interests in public spaces. The establishment and maintenance of an eruv constitutes a public demarcation and

designation of a particular neighborhood or precinct as affiliated with a particular religious group.

32. An eruv conveys, and the contemplated eruv in Westhampton Beach will convey, an equally specific and particularized communicative message to other practicing and observant Jews who do not share the views or practices of the proponents of the eruv herein; i.e., that they are not "real," "true" or "observant" Jews, and that, in any event and whether they like it or not, the practices or beliefs of other forms of the Judaism are nevertheless imposed upon them since their community has literally and symbolically been surrounded by, defined by, and entangled with the physical indicia and accoutrement of a religion they do not practice.

33. The establishment of an eruv in the Village serves no secular purpose, reflects a governmental endorsement of a particular form of religious belief and practice, reflects governmental discrimination between religions, reflects a governmental preference for a particular form of religious belief and practice, is coercive in nature to those who do not share the views of the endorsed and favored religious practice, and represents an excessive entanglement between government and religion.

JPOE Opposes the Eruv

34. JPOE's membership consists of approximately 300 Jewish and non-Jewish individuals who reside in the Villages of Westhampton Beach and Quogue, and the Town of Southampton, and their environs, and who are opposed to the installation and establishment of an *eruv* within their communities.

35. The interpretation of Jewish law which finds its physical expression and embodiment in the establishment of an eruv is rejected and is in fact antithetical to the beliefs of many Jews, including Sheiffer, Lubliner and other members of JPOE, who view it as kind of

legalistic interpretation of Jewish law which is inconsistent with the true spiritual interpretation and observance of Judaism.

36. Upon information and belief, it is the official position of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, the umbrella group of Reform Rabbis in the United States, that the creation of an eruv is a kind of "legal fiction" which is inconsistent with a true spiritual observance of the Jewish Sabbath.

37. Given the Village's broad and exclusive authority to regulate and control the public rights of way within the Village, and notwithstanding any positions taken, not taken, implied or denied by the Village heretofore, should the eruv be constructed within the Village, the public areas encompassed thereby will be identified as areas designated and marked for and by the use of a particular religious group in a manner not permitted to other religions.

38. Given the Village's broad and exclusive authority to regulate and control the public rights of way within the Village, and notwithstanding any positions taken, not taken, implied or denied by the Village heretofore, should the eruv be constructed within the Village it will signal and constitute, and be reasonably understood by JPOE's members and the general public as, the Village's endorsement of the particular form of Judaism practiced by the members of EEEA to the exclusion and rejection of the practices of other Jews in the Village.

Verizon and LIPA

39. Defendants Verizon and LIPA maintain and operate utility poles located in the Village of Westhampton Beach.

40. Upon information and belief, Verizon and LIPA have publicly stated their willingness to allow EEEA to install *lechis* upon their utility poles for the purpose of establishing

an eruv in and about the Village of Westhampton Beach and have entered into contracts with EEEA to that effect.

41. Upon information and belief, on or about May 2010, Verizon entered into a written agreement with EEEA pursuant to which Verizon agreed to permit EEEA to affix *lechis* to Verizon's poles.

42. Upon information and belief, on or about July 27, 2010, LIPA entered into a written License Agreement with EEEA pursuant to which LIPA agreed to permit EEEA to affix *lechis* to LIPA's utility poles located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Villages of Westhampton Beach and Quogue, and the Town of Southampton, for the purpose of establishing and maintaining an *eruv* within the boundaries of said municipalities.

43. The establishment of an eruv on LIPA poles in the Villages of Westhampton Beach and/or Quogue would provide no secular benefit to such municipalities or to LIPA.

44. On about January 13, 2011, EEEA and other parties commenced an action in this Court entitled *East End Eruv Association, Inc. et. al. v. The Village of Westhampton Beach et al.*, (11-cv-0213)(the "EEEA action"), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting and enjoining the Villages of Westhampton Beach and Quogue, and the Town of Southampton, among other parties, from taking or withholding any public action that would prevent EEEA from constructing and maintaining an *eruv* within the jurisdictional boundaries of said municipalities including, without limitation, preventing and enjoining said municipalities from interfering with LIPA's ability to permit attachment of *lechis* to its poles located in said municipalities.

45. Upon information and belief, in commencing the EEEA Action, EEEA acted in concert with LIPA, and with LIPA's foreknowledge and active support, cooperation,

acquiescence, for the joint purpose of actively promoting, supporting and compelling the construction and establishment of an *eruv* in the subject municipalities.

46. On or about January 18, 2011, LIPA, together with Verizon, commenced an action entitled *Verizon New York Inc. v. Village of Westhampton Beach, et al* (11-cv-0252)(the "Verizon action") seeking essentially the identical relief as the EEEA Action, including a demand for declaratory and injunctive relief preventing and enjoining the defendant municipalities from interfering with LIPA's ability to permit attachment of lechis to its poles located in said municipalities.

47. Upon information and belief, in commencing the Verizon action, LIPA acted in concert with EEEA, and with the EEEA's foreknowledge and active support, cooperation, acquiescence, for the joint purpose of actively promoting and supporting the construction and establishment of an *eruv*. Further upon information and belief, the attorneys representing LIPA in the instant action are being paid by, and are acting in concert with and under the direction and control, of EEEA and its attorneys.

48. Upon information and belief, the simultaneous commencement of the EEEA action and the Verizon action are part of a common plan conceived by EEEA and LIPA, among other parties, to promote and support EEEA's private religious agenda, and to promote and support the construction and establishment of an *eruv* in the Westhampton Beach area.

Count I
(Declaratory Judgment – All Defendants)

49. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 48 as though fully set forth herein.

50. The establishment of an *eruv* in the Village serves no secular purpose, reflects a governmental endorsement of a particular form of religious belief and practice, reflects

governmental discrimination between religions and governmental preference for a particular form of religious belief and practice, is coercive in nature to those who do not share the views of the endorsed and favored religious practice, and represents an excessive entanglement between government and religion.

51. An actual and justiciable controversy exists between the parties as to whether the construction, erection, establishment or maintenance of an eruv within or about the public spaces of the Village of Westhampton Beach constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

52. An actual and justiciable controversy exists between the parties as to whether the construction, erection, establishment or maintenance of an eruv within or about the public spaces of the Village of Westhampton Beach constitutes a violation of the Article I, Section 3 of the New York State Constitution.

53. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

54. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment declaring that the use of public property, including but not limited to utility poles within the Village, for the purpose of the construction, erection, establishment or maintenance of an eruv constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a violation of the Article I, Section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and a violation of the plaintiffs' rights under thereunder, and as additionally provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Count II
(Injunctive Relief – All Defendants)

55. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 54 as though fully set forth herein.

56. Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants, each and all, from erecting, constructing, establishing, or maintaining an eruv within the Village of Westhampton Beach, to the extent that any component parts of said eruv are located on public property, within public rights of way, or upon existing structures located upon such public property within the Village, or to the extent that said eruv encloses any public spaces within the Village, which injunction shall include but not be limited to precluding defendants from attaching lechis to Verizon or LPA utility poles located on public rights of way within the Village.

57. In the absence of injunctive relief, the constitutionally protected rights of the plaintiffs will be irreparably damaged.

58. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

Count III
(Establishment Clause Violation – Nominal Damages)

59. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 58 as though fully set forth herein.

60. The establishment of an eruv in the Village serves no secular purpose, reflects a governmental endorsement of a particular form of religious belief and practice, reflects governmental discrimination between religions and governmental preference for a particular form of religious belief and practice, is coercive in nature to those who do not share the views of the endorsed and favored religious practice, and represents an excessive entanglement between government and religion.

61. Defendants have been and are acting under color of law in advancing efforts to imminently construct and establish an eruv in contravention of the Establishment Clause and in

violation of Plaintiffs' rights thereunder and as further extended by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Count IV
(Declaratory Judgment – LIPA)

62. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 61 as though fully set forth herein.

63. An actual controversy within the jurisdiction of this Court exists as to whether the use of LIPA-operated utility poles for the purpose of establishing an eruv by permanently affixing lechis thereto constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

64. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

65. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment declaring, adjudging and decreeing that the use of LIPA-operated utility poles for the purpose of establishing an eruv by permanently affixing lechis thereto constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Count V
(Establishment Clause Violation – LIPA)

66. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 65 as though fully set forth herein.

67. LIPA's actions complained of herein violate, and have violated, plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.

68. LIPA has acted under the color of state law to deprive plaintiffs of its rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States in violation of 42 U.S.C § 1983.

69. LIPA was and is motivated by an intent to interfere with plaintiffs' civil rights, and at all times was aware that it was acting in violation of the United States Constitution and federal law.

70. As a result of the foregoing, plaintiffs have suffered damage and have been injured, and are entitled to nominal damages and to the recovery of their attorneys' fees in this action.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand judgment as follows:


- (a) Declaring, adjudging and decreeing that the use of public property, including but not limited to utility poles within the Village of Westhampton Beach, for the purpose of the construction, erection, establishment or maintenance of an eruv constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a violation of the Article I, Section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and a violation of the plaintiffs' rights under thereunder.
- (b) Preliminarily and Permanently enjoining the Defendants, each and all, from erecting, constructing, establishing, or maintaining an eruv within the Village of Westhampton Beach, to the extent that any component parts of said eruv are located on public property, within public rights of way, or upon existing structures located upon such public property within the Village, or to the extent that said eruv encloses any public spaces within the Village, which injunction shall include

but not be limited to precluding defendants from attaching lechis to Verizon or LIPA utility poles located on public rights of way within the Village.

- (c) Awarding Plaintiffs nominal damages for the defendants' violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983;
- (d) Declaring, adjudging and decreeing that the use of LIPA-operated utility poles for the purpose of establishing an eruv by permanently affixing lechis thereto constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
- (e) Awarding Plaintiffs nominal damages for LIPA's particular violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights (Count V) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983;
- (f) Awarding Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;
- (g) Granting such other and further relief and the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: Central Islip, New York
July 30, 2012

SINNREICH KOSAKOFF & MESSINA LLP

By: 

Jonathan Sinnreich, Esq.
267 Carleton Avenue, Suite 301
Central Islip, New York 11722
(631) 650-1200

*Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Jewish People for the Betterment of
Westhampton Beach, Inc., Arnold
Sheiffer and Estelle Lubliner*

EXHIBIT H

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

EAST END ERUV ASSOCIATION, INC.,
MARVIN TENZER, MORRIS TUCHMAN,
CLINTON GREENBAUM, ALAN H.
SCHECHTER, CAROL SCHECHTER,
JEFFREY LEAN, ALEXA LEAN, DEBORAH
POLLACK and SIMCHA POLLACK,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

THE VILLAGE OF WESTHAMPTON BEACH,
THE VILLAGE OF QUOGUE, and THE TOWN OF
SOUTHAMPTON

Defendants.

Index No. CV 11-0213 (LDW) (AKT)

**DECLARATION OF MORRIS TUCHMAN PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1746 IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR,
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST
WESTHAMPTON BEACH**

I, MORRIS TUCHMAN, hereby declare under penalty of perjury:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in New York. I am a plaintiff in the above-captioned proceeding and I have been involved in the efforts to establish an eruv in Westhampton Beach and parts of Quogue and Southampton (collectively, the "Municipalities"). As such, I am familiar with the facts and circumstances set forth herein. I submit this Declaration in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, for a Preliminary Injunction Against Westhampton Beach.

2. I maintain personal residences in Queens, New York, and in Westhampton Beach, New York.

3. As an observant Jew, my religious beliefs are informed by thousands of years of Jewish tradition and by the writings and teachings of my rabbis, teachers, and spiritual advisors,

both past and present. Part of my strongly-held religious beliefs is the primacy of *halakha*, or the Jewish legal system, which establishes a framework for my entire life. A second core element of my beliefs is *kehillah*, or community, and the importance of joining together with members of my community to pray, study, and worship, to mourn at sad times and to celebrate in times of joy.

4. Part of my adherence to Jewish law is my observance of Shabbat, the Jewish day of rest, which spans from Friday evening until Saturday night. On Shabbat, I and many observant Jews refrain from certain activities, such as working, cooking, using electricity, or riding in cars and do not carry items in public places (*e.g.*, in the street, in communal areas, or from one private space to another). That prohibition includes the use of strollers and wheelchairs outside of one's own home. Jewish law has developed a concept called an "*eruv*," which, through the erection of symbolic markers, creates a literal and symbolic boundary around a community within which observant Jews may carry and use strollers or wheelchairs within that private space without violating the laws of Shabbat. The concept of the *eruv* has existed for more than two thousand years. The establishment of an *eruv* has no effect on non-Jews and non-observant Jews. It does not change what they can or cannot do. On the other hand, establishment of an *eruv* is incumbent upon observant Jews. As Rabbi Joseph Karo (1488-1575) wrote in his *Shulhan Arukh*, the classical code of Jewish law that has gained universal acceptance by observant Jews the world over, "It is a mitzvah [religious obligation] to strive to make *eyruvin* [plural of *eruv*] for courtyards." See R. Joseph Karo, SHULHAN ARUKH, *Orah Hayyim* 366:13, in 4A MISHNAH BERURAH 352, 353 (A. Orenstein ed., Pitsgah Foundation trans. 2001), a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

5. Another element of my adherence to Jewish law is my sense of obligation to pray and worship with my community, especially on Shabbat. On Shabbat, many observant Jews recite prayers that can only be said with a *minyan* (a quorum of Jewish adults), including the reading of the weekly Torah portion. On special occasions, we celebrate life cycle events in the synagogue on Shabbat with readings from the Torah. On the memorial anniversary of loved ones, we recite the Mourner's *Kaddish*, which also may only be recited in the presence of a *minyan*. Without an eruv, many observant Jews who use wheelchairs or who have children who must ride in strollers are confined to their homes and are unable to participate in these traditions or fulfill many of their other ritual obligations.

6. Many of the same restrictions apply on Yom Kippur (the Jewish Day of Atonement) as on Shabbat. Specifically, many observant Jews who rely on strollers and wheelchairs will not leave their homes on Yom Kippur in the absence of an eruv. Accordingly, they are home-bound on what is considered to be one of the holiest days of the Jewish year, a day on which the vast majority of the special prayers may only be recited in the presence of a *minyan*.

7. Jewish tradition does not ignore the plight of those who are dependent on strollers and wheelchairs. The establishment of an eruv liberates such people from their homes and permits them to observe Shabbat and Yom Kippur to their fullest, with a *minyan* and with their synagogue communities. To that end, in March of 2010, I and others formed EEEA to work to establish an eruv in the Municipalities.

8. Since forming EEEA, Plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of loss of their constitutional right to freely practice their religion, losses incurred on pole walks in preparation for the establishment of the eruv, the procurement of an insurance policy as required under the

contracts with Verizon and LIPA, negotiating with Verizon and LIPA over the agreements, and losses incurred by families who, when permitted, must hire individuals to push their carriages, strollers, or wheelchairs to synagogue on the Sabbath and Yom Kippur due to the absence of an eruv.

9. If EEEA is not permitted to establish an eruv in the Municipalities, my family and I will continue to be unable fully to practice our religion.

10. I have many grandchildren. Some of them cannot walk to my synagogue in Westhampton Beach on their own and must ride in strollers. Because there is no eruv in Westhampton Beach, I, my wife or some or all of my children and grandchildren, cannot fully observe Shabbat and Yom Kippur when my grandchildren visit me in Westhampton Beach, because someone must stay home with the young children throughout Shabbat and Yom Kippur. Moreover, since there is no eruv, I am unable to carry a prayer shawl, prayer books, "dress shoes" (as we live about two miles from the synagogue) or a Bible to the synagogue and must leave them at the synagogue and "pray" that it does not rain on the Shabbat. I am further unable to carry keys or identification to the synagogue.

11. I have been personally involved in the efforts to establish an eruv in the Municipalities since 2008.

12. On or about March 7, 2008, Rabbi Marc Schneier submitted a petition on behalf of the Hampton Synagogue to the Board of Trustees of Westhampton Beach ("Westhampton Beach Trustees") for the establishment of an eruv in Westhampton Beach.

13. The eruv petition was discussed during meetings of the Westhampton Beach Trustees in April 2008 and May 2008.

14. During the May 2008 meeting, Mayor Teller made a motion to add to the agenda a resolution to approve the eruv petition. Public comment followed, which included statements by one community member who expressed “a fear . . . that what happened in Lawrence and Cedarhurst” – two communities with eruvs in which there was a significant increase in the observant Jewish populations – “could end up happening in Westhampton Beach.” The motion was defeated by a 3-2 vote of the Trustees. The Trustees refused to even put the petition on the agenda for consideration.

15. By letter dated May 23, 2008, Rabbi Schneier informed Mayor Teller, the Trustees, and the members of the Westhampton Beach Community that the Hampton Synagogue would suspend its application for the eruv, citing the controversy that the application had evoked throughout the village, including comments that “this is the beginning of a push by the rabbi to create ‘another Lawrence,’” and “just what we need, more Jews.”

16. Such sentiment continued when the eruv proponents subsequently sought to pursue the establishment of the eruv in the municipalities through private contracts with Verizon and LIPA. Westhampton Beach had knowledge of these contracts, and even wrote a letter to Verizon’s counsel on or about May 18, 2009 advising Verizon that Verizon requires the village’s approval in order to fulfill its obligations under its contract. Since those contracts were executed, Westhampton Beach has interfered with them by ongoing public statements, letters, and their aggressive defense of this litigation, despite the fact that there is no local, state, or federal law that prohibits the affixation of lechis to telephone poles. As a result, Verizon and LIPA have been unable and/or unwilling to perform them.


17. In stark contrast to the actions of Westhampton Beach, a multitude of cities and municipalities statewide, nationwide, and worldwide have established eruvin without

controversy. In addition to the many stories of cooperation discussed in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, *see* Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-41, the city of New Haven, Connecticut has since been working with the Jewish community in New Haven to preserve the eruv. It is my understanding and belief that the Connecticut Department of Transportation has worked alongside the community's Rabbi to determine how best to keep the eruv intact when a \$35 million project to overhaul the town's roads begins next year. *See* Paul Bass, *Eruv Fits Early Into Route 34 Plans*, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT, July 30, 2012, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

18. I, therefore, respectfully request that this Court grant Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment or, in the alternative, for a preliminary injunction against Westhampton Beach.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on August 7, 2012



MORRIS TUCHMAN